Book Review of Robert Nozick: “Anarchy, State, and Utopia”

 Book Review of  Robert Nozick: “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” – House of Intellectual (wordpress.com)

Background:

American political philosopher Robert Nozick wrote “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” in 1974. This book won the 1975 US National Book Award in Philosophy and Religion, was translated into 11 languages, and was named one of the “100 most influential books since the war” (1945–1995) by the UK Times Literary Supplement.

In contrast to John Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice” (1971), Nozick advocates for a minimal state that is “limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, and enforcement of contracts.” Nozick argues that when a state takes on more responsibilities, it violates people’s rights. To support the idea of a minimal state, Nozick presents an argument demonstrating how the minimalist state arises naturally from a Lockean state of nature. He also states that any expansion of state power beyond the minimalist threshold is unjustified.

Abstract:

The book “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” features Nozick’s entitlement theory, which considers humans as valuable entities and permits the redistribution of goods only with their consent. This theory is influenced by the ideas of John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and Friedrich Hayek. Additionally, the book defends the concept of minarchist libertarianism and argues against extreme views like anarcho-capitalism. Nozick claims that anarcho-capitalism would eventually lead to a dominant private defense and judicial agency that would function as a de facto “state.” As a result, the concept of anarcho-capitalism would only exist for a limited period before a minimalist state emerged.

Politics of Nozick 

In the preface of “Anarchy, State, and Utopia,” Nozick discusses the standard approach to presenting philosophical work as the final word. However, he believes philosophers are more aware of their work’s weaknesses and should acknowledge them. He criticizes the tendency to force ideas into a predetermined shape and hide any inconsistencies. Nozick’s work stands apart from this approach because he believes in doubts and beliefs without hiding any discrepancies.

Theory of State of Nature

Nozick’s objective is to demonstrate the importance of examining a Lockean state of nature to determine whether a state is necessary. He argues that if an anarchic society is proven to be worse than one with a state, the latter should be chosen as the better alternative. One should adopt a balanced view of a non-state situation to compare the two scenarios effectively. Instead, the focus should be on a state-of-nature situation where people generally adhere to moral constraints and act as they ought. Investigating the nature and flaws of this situation is crucial in deciding whether a state or anarchy should prevail. Nozick plans to describe the permissible and impermissible actions in a non-political society and how violations of these constraints could lead to the emergence of a state. He acknowledges the limitations of his “invisible hand” explanation of the minimal state but believes it is fundamental in explaining the political realm in terms of the non-political. However, his later “genealogical” ambition aims to explain both the political and moral by tracing beneficial cooperative practices back to our hunter-gatherer ancestors and beyond, explaining the fundamental status of individual rights.

The State of Nature

Nozick explains the features of the Lockean state of nature, including the right of an individual to seek compensation for rights violations and the acceptability of punishment for offenders. However, this raises some problems, which Nozick believes can be solved by establishing mutual-protection associations. These associations may lead to entrepreneurs selling protective services, resulting in the dominant association and, ultimately, a minimal state. Nozick prefers the idea of invisible-hand explanations, which suggest that voluntary agreements between individuals can create patterns that look like they were designed but were not. However, protective agencies still need to be a state, as they do not offer everyone the same degree of protection and lack a monopoly on using force. Therefore, Nozick believes that a necessary condition for the existence of a state is the announcement of punishment for anyone who uses power without permission.

Moral Constraints and the State

Nozick arrives at the night-watchman state of classical liberalism theory by showing that there are non-redistributive reasons for the redistributive procedure of making its clients pay for the protection of others. He defines an ultraminimal state, which would not have this seemingly redistributive feature but would be the only one allowed to enforce rights. 26 Proponents of this ultraminimal state do not defend it on the grounds of trying to minimize the total of (weighted) violations of rights (what he calls utilitarianism of rights. 30 ) That idea would mean, for example, that someone could punish another person they know to be innocent to calm down a mob that would otherwise violate even more rights. 29 This is not the philosophy behind the ultraminimal state. 27–28 Instead, its proponents hold its members’ rights are a side constraint on what can be done to them. This side-constraint view reflects the underlying Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means, so the rights of one individual cannot be violated to avoid violations of the rights of other people. 30–31 Which principle should we choose, then? Nozick will not try to prove which one is better. Instead, he gives reasons to prefer the Kantian view and later points to problems with classic utilitarianism.

The first reason he gives in favour of the Kantian principle is that the analogy between the individual case (in which we choose to sacrifice now for a more significant benefit later: 32 ) and the social case (in which we offer the interests of one individual for the greater social good) is incorrect:

There are only individual people, different individual people with their personal lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of others uses him and benefits the others. Nothing more. Talk of an overall social good covers this up. (Intentionally?). To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take into account the fact that he is a separate person, that he is the only life he has. He does not get some overbalancing good from his sacrifice.

— Robert Nozick, Anarchy, “State and Utopia,” Reprint Edition, 2013, p. 33

A second reason focuses on the non-aggression principle. Are we prepared to dismiss this principle? That is, can we accept that some individuals may harm some innocent in some instances? 34 (This non-aggression principle does not include, of course, self-defenses and perhaps some other exceptional cases he points out. 34–35 )

He then goes on to expose some problems with utilitarianism by discussing whether animals should be taken into account in the practical calculation of happiness, if that depends on the kind of animal, if killing them painlessly would be acceptable, and so on. 35–42 He believes that utilitarianism is not appropriate even with animals.

But Nozick’s most famous argument for the side-constraint view against classical utilitarianism and the idea that only felt experience matters is his Experience Machine thought experiment. 42 It induces whatever illusory experience one might wish, but it prevents the subject from doing anything or making contact with anything. There is only pre-programmed neural stimulation sufficient for the illusion. Nozick pumps the intuition that we have a reason to avoid plugging into the Experience Machine forever. 43 This is not to say that “plugging in” might not be the best all-things-considered choice for some who are terminally ill and in great pain. The point of the thought experiment is to articulate a weighty reason not to plug in, a reason that should not be there if all that matters is felt experience.

Prohibition, Compensation, and Risk

To achieve a night-watchman state, a procedure includes compensating non-members who cannot enforce their rights. The association deems its enforcement mechanism less risky than that of non-members. Compensation is given to address any disadvantages non-members face due to their inability to enforce their rights. Assuming that non-members take reasonable precautions and adjust their activities based on the association’s prohibition, the association must elevate the non-member’s status by equal to the difference between their position on an indifference curve and their original position.

Nozick introduces the Compensation Principle, which is vital for understanding how an ultraminimal state can transition to a minimal state without violating anyone’s rights. The discussion centers around whether it is justifiable for some individuals to pay for the protection of others or be compelled to do so, and this is explored through a natural rights perspective. Therefore, he focuses on the development of a theory of compensation.

The discussion begins with what happens if someone goes beyond a limit, like causing physical harm. If the person affected has consented, there is no issue. Unlike Locke, Nozick does not hold a paternalistic view and thinks that an individual can allow others to do things to them or do something to themselves. However, if person B crosses person A’s boundaries without their consent, is it acceptable if they receive compensation?

According to Nozick, compensation means anything that restores someone’s sense of fairness after wrongdoing, as long as that person took reasonable steps to prevent the situation. He believes compensation alone is insufficient, as some individuals may violate others’ rights without revealing their identity. Therefore, those who violate others’ rights should face additional consequences as a deterrent. For simplicity, further discussion on deterrence is provided in another section of this article.

The topic of punishment and justice is discussed by Nozick, who favours a retributive theory. However, he concludes that not all rights violations can be deterred under this theory. He then proposes the idea of compensation, suggesting that anyone can do anything if they provide total compensation afterwards. However, there are issues with this view. Firstly, if someone gains by violating another’s rights and compensates the victim up to the point of indifference, the violator benefits. The violator should provide additional compensation, but determining a fair price is difficult. Nozick believes negotiations should take place whenever possible, but in cases where negotiation is not possible, it is unclear whether all acts should be accepted if compensation is paid. Secondly, allowing anything if compensation is paid creates fear among people. Nozick argues that even if someone knows they will be compensated for their rights being violated, they will still be afraid. These issues raise important questions about justice and compensation.

• Financial compensation alone cannot fully address the harm caused by assault. Fear experienced by the victim cannot be compensated for, as it is not solely the responsibility of the assaulter. 
• If compensation for fear were the only solution, non-victims would be left uncompensated for their worries. Moreover, it is difficult to accurately measure the impact of anxiety after the fact, as we tend to downplay its significance. Instead, Nozick suggests calculating “Market Compensation,” which represents the compensation that would have been agreed upon if negotiations had occurred before the incident. However, this approach is only sometimes feasible, according to Nozick. 

It can be concluded that anything that causes general fear can be prohibited. This includes using people as a means, which goes against Kantian principles. However, banning all boundary crossings without prior consent would be too restrictive, as accidents and unintentional acts can occur. Additionally, obtaining consent may be costly, especially if the victim is in a remote location. The most efficient policy would allow unfeared actions without prior agreement as long as the transaction costs of obtaining prior consent are higher than the costs of posterior compensation.

It is essential to understand that a single action may not instill fear if it’s unlikely to cause harm. However, considering all risky activities together increases the probability of injury significantly. This creates a dilemma, as banning these activities would be overly restrictive. One proposed solution is to establish a threshold value (V) that indicates a violation of rights if the probability of harm (p) multiplied by the potential amount of liability (H) exceeds this value. However, this approach may need to align with a natural-rights perspective. As one philosopher put it:

According to Robert Nozick’s book “Anarchy, State and Utopia,” some traditions believe stealing violates a person’s rights, even if it is just a penny or a pin. These traditions do not set a minimum threshold for harm, even if injury is guaranteed to occur.

Nozick does discuss insurance solutions for these situations, but what about those who cannot afford insurance or compensate others for the risks they pose? Should they be prohibited from taking specific actions?

Prohibiting risky actions, whether because they are financially uncovered or too dangerous, goes against the idea of a free society that values liberty and allows individuals to act freely as long as they do not harm others. Limiting an individual’s freedom to act based on potential risks, even if they pose no cost to anyone else, is not in line with this idea.

In his book “Anarchy, State and Utopia,” Robert Nozick discusses the Principle of Compensation, which states that dangerous actions that are commonly done should be prohibited. Still, the especially disadvantaged individual should be compensated for the prohibition. For example, people with epilepsy can be forbidden from driving, but only if they are reimbursed for the costs of being unable to move, such as chauffeurs or taxis. This compensation will only happen if the benefits of increased security outweigh these costs. Nozick compares this to blackmail and considers such transactions unproductive. Similarly, a person with epilepsy should not negotiate payment for not doing something risky to others. Nozick’s conclusion is to balance safety with fairness for all individuals.

Nozick raises concerns regarding the compensation principle. His first point is that the action must be generally accepted, as eccentric and dangerous activities should not be rewarded. For instance, someone who enjoys playing Russian roulette with others’ lives without their consent should be prohibited without exception. However, the definition of a generally accepted action is subjective and can be manipulated. For example, Russian roulette could be considered fun and thus eligible for compensation. 

Secondly, if the peculiar and hazardous action is the only way a person can achieve something important to them, such as having fun or supporting themselves, it may warrant compensation. 

Thirdly, Nozick acknowledges that he does not have an explicit theory of disadvantage, making it challenging to determine what qualifies as a “special disadvantage.”

The concept needs more development as no governing body defines terms in a state of nature. A similar issue is discussed on page 89. It is not necessary to state the principle precisely, only to assert the correctness of certain principles, like the principle of compensation, which requires those who prohibit risky activities from being forbidden from those same activities. However, I hesitate to present and use a code that has yet to be fully fleshed out. It is acceptable to start with an unclear principle as long as it serves its purpose. This is discussed in Robert Nozick’s book, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Reprint Edition, 2013, on page 87.

State

If an individual seeks to uphold justice through a method that is either unknown or poses a risk, it may be prevented. However, even if the method used by an individual does not pose a significant threat, if many others use similar techniques, it may result in a real risk that exceeds acceptable limits. In such a situation, it can be challenging to determine who should stop it since nobody is held personally responsible. Although independents may collaborate to find a solution, everyone may choose to be a free-rider and continue their risky activities. Nozick has refused to accept the “principle of fairness” proposed by H.L.A. Hart to deal with free riders, arguing that one cannot charge for benefits without prior agreement.

When the principle of fairness fails, how do we determine what is right? The natural law tradition only guides our procedural rights. Nozick believes we have the right to know if an appropriate and reliable method is used to determine guilt. We have the right to resist if this information isn’t publicly available. After reviewing the data, We may only participate if we find the procedure fair and reliable. Protective agencies can enforce these rights by publishing a list of accepted methods and punishing anyone who violates it. While other companies may enter the business, only the dominant protective agency can ensure clients that unaccepted procedures won’t be used on them. Every individual has this right.

However, there is a significant distinction to consider. The protective agency may put specific independent individuals at a disadvantage. This specifically pertains to those who use a prohibited method, can only afford the agency’s services with significant effort, or are too impoverished to pay. Consequently, these individuals may end up bearing the costs of the agency’s paying clients.

Addressing the notion of compensating those who face disadvantages. This compensation should only cover the extra cost incurred by the disadvantaged beyond what they would typically pay for the risky or unknown procedure they want to undergo. However, if the needy person cannot pay for a protection policy even after receiving compensation, the compensation should cover the policy’s total cost. (Reference: pages 111-112)

The protective services only cover paying clients because they are the ones who were initially defenseless in this situation. This means that non-paying clients may receive different protection.

Will this compensation mechanism lead to a free-riding problem? According to Nozick, it should be fine since the compensation is only equal to the cost of a basic policy plus the cost of self-protection and what the person can comfortably afford. The procedure also covers non-paying clients, not compensated or independent contractors. As a result, purchasing a comprehensive protection policy becomes increasingly essential if there are more free riders. (Reference: Nozick, p. 113)

1. As per Chapter 3 of Nozick’s argument, for an organization to be considered a state, two conditions must be met: it must have a monopoly on the use of force and provide universal protection. Our situation meets these criteria and can be seen as a state-like entity.

The protective agency operates like a state in two ways. First, it has a monopoly due to its competitive advantage, with no special entitlement or right to hold that position. This does not mean that might make right, but rather that those with power can enforce prohibitions, regardless of their special entitlement.

According to Robert Nozick in “Anarchy, State and Utopia” (2013), pp. 118-119, most people are clients of the system. However, there may be some independent actors who use approved procedures. However, there may also be independent actors who use unreliable methods that the system disapproves of when dealing with other independent actors.

“individualist anarchism” is based on the belief that all states are inherently illegitimate. However, this book refutes that claim by demonstrating that some states can be formed through legitimate means. The current state monopoly has been established through morally acceptable steps, such as providing universal protection and compensation for those who have faced disadvantages. As a result, the state is not violating anyone’s rights.

Please note that the entity being discussed is not a traditional state. It functions like a company, and independent actors are still at play. However, as Robert Nozick explains, the dominant agency in this entity has many characteristics of a state, and its administrative structures and specialized personnel make it quite different from a stateless society. While it does not fit the Weberian definition of a state as the sole authorizer of violence, it does act as the sole effective judge over the permissibility of violence. Therefore, Nozick suggests it could be called a “state-like entity.”

In his warning, Nozick cautions that going from being a de facto monopoly (ultraminimal state) to a “state-like entity” that compensates some independent individuals (minimal state) is not mandatory. However, paying these individuals is a moral duty. This does not negate Nozick’s rebuttal to the individualist anarchist and still follows the invisible hand concept. Essentially, to provide universal protection, the agency does not need to plan to become a state; it can happen naturally if it fulfills its obligation to provide protection.

Pre-emptive Attack

Nozick discusses pre-emptive attacks and concludes that actions that are not inherently wrong should not be prohibited, even if they increase the likelihood of future wrongs. This principle distinguishes between a protection agency’s reasonable and excessive prohibitions, such as preventing people from joining another protective agency. Nozick’s declaration does not forbid others from doing so.

Distributive Justice

Nozick and Rawls sparked a debate between libertarianism and liberalism regarding justice theories. Nozick proposed an entitlement theory that operates on four principles: justice in acquisition, rectification, holdings, and transfer. Unlike other approaches, such as egalitarianism and utilitarianism, Nozick’s theory is non-patterned and historical. His famous Wilt Chamberlain argument demonstrates that patterned principles of just distribution are incompatible with liberty. Nozick argues that if a reasonable allocation, ordered by a patterned direction, is freely exchanged by individuals, any resulting distribution is also just, even if it does not follow the original pattern. Therefore, to maintain a patterned principle, the state must constantly interfere with people’s freedom to exchange shares, violating liberty.

Nozick compares taxation to forced labour by presenting a scenario. He asks readers to imagine two men – one who works longer to earn money for a movie ticket and spends his extra time on leisure activities like watching the sunset. Nozick questions whether there is any difference between taking away the second man’s leisure (similar to forced labour) and taking away the first man’s possessions. He concludes that there is no difference in principle and suggests that this argument could be applied to other forms of taxation beyond labour. Nozick argues that end-state and patterned principles of distributive justice result in partial ownership of people and their work. This shift from classical liberalism’s concept of self-ownership to partial property rights in other individuals is a crucial feature of these principles.

In his analysis, Nozick briefly examines Locke’s theory of acquisition. After addressing some initial objections, he introduces a refinement to Locke’s proviso that requires leaving “enough and as good” property for others when taking possession of an unowned object. Nozick proposes a “Lockean proviso” that restricts appropriation if it worsens the situation of others. For example, taking control of the only water source in a desert would be unacceptable and charge exorbitant prices for its use. However, Nozick does not apply this argument to situations such as a medical researcher discovering a cure for a disease and selling it at any price. Furthermore, he does not provide a theory or mechanism for correcting abuses of appropriation, such as taking property when there is not enough available for others.

The Difference Principle

Nozick criticizes John Rawls’s Difference Principle by pointing out that the wealthy could use their power to undermine social cooperation with those who are worse off. Rawls suggests that the rich should assist the less fortunate in social collaboration. However, Nozick questions why the wealthy should be obligated to help the less profitable due to their inequality and why the less fortunate should not accept the inequality and benefit the rich. Additionally, Nozick challenges Rawls’s theory on morally arbitrary natural endowments, arguing that the natural advantages enjoyed by the wealthy do not violate anyone’s rights. Therefore they have a right to them. Moreover, Nozick believes that Rawls’s proposal to use inequalities to help the less fortunate is morally arbitrary.

Original Position

According to Nozick, historical entitlement is crucial in decision-making, so he disagrees with the Original Position. He believes that using an end-state principle to determine outcomes in the Original Position ignores the importance of historical information, which is necessary for decisions like punishments and penalties.

Equality, Envy, and Exploitation 

According to Nozick, granting and enforcing positive rights such as equality of opportunity and the right to life requires resources and actions that may belong to others with their rights and entitlements. He argues that Marxian exploitation results from people’s ignorance of economics.

Demoktesis

Demoktesis is a theoretical scenario demonstrating the conflict between democracy and libertarianism, specifically the entitlement theory. The concept involves people incorporating themselves and selling shares to gain more money. However, this leads to a situation where some individuals become dominated by others through voluntary exchanges. To prevent this, new terms of incorporation are written that limit the number of shares one person can own. As the process continues, everyone sells off rights in themselves but retains one share in each request for attending stockholders’ meetings. The system becomes unwieldy, leading to a convention for buying and selling shares until every person owns precisely one stake in every other person, including themselves. This results in one grand meeting where decisions are made by those entitled to cast at least 100,000 votes. This system is called demoktesis, which means “ownership of the people, by the people, and for the people.” It is considered the highest form of social life and a modern democratic state.

The Framework for Utopia

Nozick’s first book discusses a meta-utopia, which allows for voluntary migration between utopias that benefit everyone. This framework is similar to the Lockean “night-watchman state,” where the state protects individual rights and ensures voluntary contracts and market transactions. Nozick’s idea emphasizes the importance of entirely voluntary associations of mutual benefit, which is the only form of social union possible for the atomistic rational agents of Anarchy, State, and Utopia. The meta-utopian framework creates and stabilizes empty cores of mutually beneficial cooperation, where no subgroup can do better by acting independently without cooperating with others. Nozick believes higher moral goals are real but only possible because of mutually beneficial cooperation.

Nozick envisioned a utopia where people could leave and form their community if they were unhappy with their current society. However, he didn’t consider that certain factors could prevent individuals from moving freely. Thomas Pogge argues that items beyond societal influence can limit people’s options, creating inequality. Nozick believed that supporting people with disabilities infringed on the freedom of the healthy. Still, Pogge contends that this creates an imbalance that restricts movement and could lead to feudalism and slavery – something Nozick would oppose. David Schaefer notes that Nozick even suggested that one could sell themselves into slavery, which goes against his own ground rules and restricts personal freedom.

Retributive and Deterrence Theories of Punishment

In Chapter 4, Nozick explores two theories of punishment: deterrence and retributive justice. To compare these theories, we need to consider the decision that a potential offender faces. This decision is based on the gains (G) from violating the victim’s rights, the probability of getting caught (p), and the costs ((C + D + E)) that the offender will face if caught. The expenses include:

• Compensation to the victim (C).
• Emotional costs (D) of being caught and put on trial.
• Financial costs (E) of the legal process.

If the equation (G – p(C + D + E)) is positive, the potential offender may be incentivized to violate the victim’s rights. Retributive justice imposes an additional cost (R) on the offender that is proportional to the harm caused or intended to be caused, considering the offender’s degree of responsibility (r). Therefore, the new decision that a potential offender will face is (G – p(C + D + E) – Rr).

However, not all potential offenders will be deterred, even with retributive justice. Suppose the gains (G) are high enough, or the probability of getting caught (p) is low. In that case, some offenders may choose to commit the crime despite the additional cost (R). Deterrence theories, on the other hand, suggest that the penalty for a crime should be minimal to deter its commission. However, this approach does not provide clear guidance on how much deterrence is necessary without punishing offenders more than the harm caused.

Nozick suggests that the utilitarian response to this problem would be to raise the penalty until the other unhappiness from the punishment exceeds the happiness gained from preventing future victimization. However, this raises the question of whether the victim’s pleasure should have more weight in the calculation than the happiness of the offender. Nozick concludes that the disciplinary framework is more straightforward and better.

Similarly, Nozick argues that self-defenses is appropriate under the retributive theory, even if the victim uses more force than necessary. The maximum amount of power a potential victim can use is determined by the harm they anticipate (H). Still, any additional energy used will be subtracted from the offender’s punishment.

Animal Rights and Utilitarianism

Chapter 3 of Nozick’s book delves into whether animals have rights or can be used for human purposes. He examines whether the animal species has any bearing on how they can be treated. Nozick considers the idea of “utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people” but ultimately rejects it, stating that utilitarianism alone is insufficient for animal ethics. He also supports ethical vegetarianism, saying that the benefits of eating animals do not justify the act. Philosopher Josh Milburn has pointed out that Nozick’s contributions to animal ethics and libertarianism have been overlooked in the literature.

Outlook

Anarchy, State, and Utopia is a book from a course taught by Robert Nozick and Michael Walzer at Harvard in 1971. The system was an ongoing debate between the two, with Nozick advocating his views in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, and Walzer in his book Spheres of Justice (1983), where he argues for “complex equality.” Murray Rothbard, an anarcho-capitalist, critiques Anarchy, State, and Utopia in his essay “Robert Nozick and the Immaculate Conception of the State” by pointing out the basis for Nozick’s arguments.

1. According to Nozick’s theory, no existing state has developed through the “invisible hand.” Therefore, he should advocate for anarchism and wait for a state to establish. Additionally, no state can be justified as individual rights are inalienable. The title-transfer theory is the only valid and enforceable contract that surrenders philosophically alienable property titles. The risk and compensation principles are fallacious and result in unlimited despotism. Nozick’s theory of “nonproductive” exchanges is invalid as all voluntary exchanges are productive in economic theory. Procedural rights do not exist, and there is no way to get from Nozick’s view of risk and nonproductive exchange to the compulsory monopoly of the ultra-minimal state. Nozick’s minimal state would also justify a maximal state on his grounds. The only “invisible hand” process that would apply would move society from its minimal state “back to anarchism.”

Arthur Allen Leff, an American legal scholar, criticized Robert Nozick’s book “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” in his 1979 article “Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law.” Leff argued that Nozick’s assertion that individuals have rights that cannot be violated by others, which forms the basis of the book, lacked justification. He further stated that no explanation was possible for this assertion. Leff believed that any desired ethical statement, including the negation of Nozick’s claim, could be “proved” if one establishes a grounding principle by assertion. Leff also found Nozick’s proposition that differences among individuals would not pose a problem if like-minded people form geographically isolated communities to be “ostentatiously unconvincing.”

Philosopher Jan Narveson, on the other hand, described Nozick’s book as “brilliant.” Meanwhile, Cato Institute fellow Tom G. Palmer praised the book as “witty and dazzling” and applauded Nozick’s strong criticism of John Rawls’s “A Theory of Justice.” Palmer also noted that academic philosophers and political theorists took Nozick’s book seriously, many of whom had not read contemporary libertarian or classical liberal material and considered Nozick’s work to be the only articulation of libertarianism available. However, some academics dismissed libertarianism as “without foundations” because Nozick did not justify his starting assumption that individuals have rights. Libertarian author David Boaz, however, believed that “Anarchy, State, and Utopia,” along with other works, defined the “hard-core” version of modern libertarianism, which essentially restated Spencer’s law of equal freedom – individuals have the right to do whatever they want as long as they respect the equal rights of others.

In his article “Social Unity and Primary Goods,” published in his Collected Papers (1999), Rawls discusses Nozick’s handling of Sen’s liberal paradox, which he believes is similar to his own. However, Rawls notes that Nozick’s fundamental rights differ from the equal basic liberties included in justice as fairness and therefore are not inalienable. In his Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy (2007), Rawls highlights that Nozick assumes just transactions to be “justice preserving” in the same way logical operations are “truth-preserving.” Rawls points out that this is an assumption requiring substantiation. He maintains that small inequalities accumulate over time, resulting in significant disparities and an unjust situation, despite Nozick’s belief that repetitive applications of “justice in holdings” and “justice in transfer” preserve an initial state of justice obtained through “justice in acquisition or rectification.”